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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWORD: NOTES FOR A
CONSISTENT AND MEANINGFUL
SIXTH AMENDMENT
RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT*
I. INTRODUCTION
A strain of Supreme Court reasoning uses a due process analy-
sis to decide Sixth Amendment claims. This approach deprives
Sixth Amendment guarantees of independent meaning and makes
them superfluous.
This Foreword suggests that the Sixth Amendment, instead of
being meaningless, was designed to play a central role in the consti-
tutional structure created by the Bill of Rights. A meaningful Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence requires viewing that amendment as part
of an integrated Bill of Rights; requires reading each of its specific
clauses not in isolation, but as part of one integrated Sixth Amend-
ment; and requires recognition of the Sixth Amendment's distinc-
tive nature as a collection of personal, affirmative guarantees.
These principles have not been consistently recognized and ap-
plied by the Supreme Court. If they were, specific Sixth Amend-
ment claims would have to be resolved using standards and
approaches different from those now applied. This Foreword will
suggest what some of the criteria for a meaningful and consistent
Sixth Amendment might be.
II. DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS AND SIxTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
A. MU'MIN V. VIRGINIA
Mu'Min v. Virginia,' decided last term, illustrates a due process
analysis controlling Sixth Amendment rights. Dawud Majid Mu'Min
* Professor, New York Law School. A.B., Princeton University, 1967; J.D., Univer-
sity of Chicago Law School, 1970; LL.M., New York University Law School, 1971.
I 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991).
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was charged with a highly publicized murder.2 This publicity con-
taminated the jury pool; of the twenty-six prospective jurors who
were examined, sixteen stated that they had heard about the crime.
Not surprisingly, the notoriety reached those picked for trial. Eight
of the twelve had learned about the case before becoming jurors; all,
however, still claimed impartiality. They said that they had neither
formed an opinion about the case nor held a prejudice against the
accused.3
" Mu'Min, however, protested the method by which the trial
court determined that the jurors were impartial. He objected that
none of the sixteen who professed advance knowledge about the
case was asked during jury selection about the source of that infor-
mation. As a result, the accused claimed that his Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury was violated.4
He lost, even though the majority, in an opinion by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, conceded that the accused's argument that such
questions would "materially assist in obtaining a jury less likely to
be tainted by pretrial publicity . . . [had] a common sense ap-
peal .... -5 The Court nevertheless rejected the reasoning, holding
2 Mu'Min, who was serving a 48-year prison sentence for murder, escaped from a
work detail, went to a shopping center, and with a weapon that he had made on the work
detail, robbed and murdered a woman who owned a carpet store. Newspaper articles
revealed the accused's prior criminal record including a report of his prior murder con-
viction, that the death penalty was not available at that prior conviction, that Mu'Min
had repeatedly been denied parole, and that he had confessed to the murder of the
carpet store owner. These articles, which were published during and shortly after the
1988 presidential election, also contained criticisms of the lax security in the prison
work gang system. Id. at 1901-02. See also id. at 1910-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting), for a
fuller description of the publicity.
3 Id. at 1902-03.
4 The Supreme Court majority stated that Mu'Min was contending "that his Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury and his right to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment were violated because the trial judge refused to question further prospec-
tive jurors about the specific contents of the news reports to which they had been ex-
posed." Id. at 1901. Justice O'Connor, concurring, decided a different issue: "The only
question before us is whether the trial court erred by crediting the assurances of eight
jurors that they could put aside what they had read or heard and render a fair verdict
based on the evidence." Id. at 1909 (O'Connor, J, concurring).
5 Id. at 1905. The Court continued, "Undoubtedly, if counsel were allowed to see
individual jurors answer questions about exactly what they had read, a better sense of
the juror's general outlook on life might be revealed, and such a revelation would be of
some use in exercising peremptory challenges.... Such questions might also have some
effect in causing jurors to re-evaluate their own answers as to whether they had formed
any opinion about the case, but this is necessarily speculative." Id.
The dissent concluded that content questioning is necessary once potential jurors
admit exposure to pretrial publicity to determine whether, even though they claim im-
partiality, the extent of the exposure should disqualify the prospective juror as a matter
of law. Id. at 1913 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Furthermore, "content questioning ... is
essential to give legal depth to the trial court's finding of impartiality." Id. at 1914.
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that helpfulness was not the controlling constitutional standard:
"To be constitutionally compelled . . . it is not enough that such
questions might be helpful. Rather, the trial court's failure to ask
these questions must render the defendant's trial fundamentally un-
fair.16 Fundamental fairness, the Court concluded, did not require
asking each potential juror in this case what he had read, and thus,
Mu'Min's constitutional rights were not infringed.7
Mu'Min had claimed a Sixth Amendment violation of his guar-
antee to an "impartial jury." Even so, the standard employed to
determine whether his rights had been violated-whether the trial
court's failure to inquire make the trial fundamentally Unfair-was
the same one that would have been used if the Sixth Amendment
did not even apply. It is the standard of due process. Its application
in MuMin made the specific Sixth Amendment guarantee
superfluous.
B. A DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
Before the protections of the Sixth Amendment were incorpo-
rated into the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, the
only constitutional constraint on state criminal proceedings came
from the general concept of due process, as Betts v. Brady made
clear:
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incor-
porate, as such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amend-
ment, although a denial by a State of rights or privileges specifically
embodied in that and others of the first eight amendments may, in
certain circumstances .... operate, in a given case, to deprive a litigant
of due process of law in violation in the Fourteenth.8
This due process protection, unlike the Sixth Amendment, does
not impose definite prescriptions or proscriptions. Instead, each in-
dividual case has to be examined as a whole.9 A constitutional viola-
tion will be found not just because some specific guarantee of the
Sixth Amendment has occurred, but only if the trial has been funda-
mentally unfair: "As we have said, the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
Finally, content questioning is necessary to assure that the trial court has the essential
information to assess accurately the credibility of potential jurors who claim impartiality.
Id. at 15.
6 Id. at 1905.
7 Id. at 1908.
8 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
9 Due process of law ... formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than those
envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its application
is less a matter of rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of
facts in a given case. Id.
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hibits the conviction and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive
to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right .... 10
Mu'Min applied the same standard as had the Betts Court. Even
though the right to an impartial jury is a Sixth Amendment right,
MuMin's analysis deprived the Sixth Amendment of independent
force. If the Sixth Amendment did not exist or did not apply to the
states, the result would have been the same. In effect, then,
MuMin's analysis proceeded as if the Constitution did not contain
an applicable, specific, impartial jury command, but only a due pro-
cess clause. Indeed, the Court's concluding comment does not even
indicate that the Sixth Amendment was at stake: "For the reasons
previously stated, we hold that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment does not reach this far, and that the voir dire ex-
amination conducted by the trial court in this case was consistent
with that provision."" I
Mu'Min is not the only Sixth Amendment case that uses an anal-
ysis submerging distinctive Sixth Amendment protections into the
generality of due process. Indeed, this due process strain has in-
fected various Sixth Amendment areas.
C. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Strickland v. Washington12 provides a prime example of the
Court's standards depriving the Sixth Amendment of separate
meaning. Strickland enunciated the criteria for determining whether
an accused has been denied his Sixth Amendment right of effective
assistance of counsel. The Court, in an opinion by Justice
O'Connor, first drew distinctions between due process and the Sixth
Amendment:
[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in or-
der to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial. The Constitution
guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines
the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions
of the Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel Clause.... Thus, a
fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is
presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues decided in
advance of the proceeding.' 3
10 Id. at 473. Betts went to hold that "while want of counsel in a particular case may
result in a conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the
amendment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any
court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented
by counsel." Id.
Ii ill S. Ct. at 1908.
12 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
13 Id. at 684-85.
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This explanation of the differences between due process and
the Sixth Amendment led in reality to a union of the two. The
Court, in essence, stated that the true constitutional right granted
the accused is the fair trial assured by due process. Strickland, then,
figuratively drops a footnote explaining that the essential elements
of a fair trial are listed in the Sixth Amendment. In this construct,
the Sixth plays only a supporting role to the starring Due Process
Clause.
While such reasoning could lead to the conclusion that a trial
satisfying the commands of the Sixth Amendment is a fair one for
due process purposes, the Court's framework, giving centrality to
the fair trial guarantee of due process, easily leads to the converse:
a trial that is fair for due process purposes is a trial that satisfies the
Sixth Amendment. And, in essence, it is this latter approach that
Strickland v. Washington adopted.
The Court's lodestar made this path inevitable: "In giving
meaning to the requirement [of effective assistance of counsel] ... ,
we must take its purpose-to ensure a fair trial-as the guide."1 4
Courts, in assessing this right to counsel claim, must concentrate on
this one point: "[T]he ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the
fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being chal-
lenged."1 5 Consequently, the accused, in order to prevail, must not
only show flawed lawyering, but also an unfair trial: "[T]he defend-
ant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the de-
fense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial .... ,,16 Finally, the Court
concluded that since the proceeding afforded Washington was "not
fundamentally unfair,"1 7 he was not deprived of his Sixth Amend-
ment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Of course, if the proceeding had been fundamentally unfair,
Washington would have been denied due process as defined by Betts
v. Brady. In other words, to establish a denial of the Sixth Amend-
ment effective assistance guarantee, an accused must also show a
due process violation. If, however, the accused can show the denial
of due process, he does not need the Sixth Amendment. The spe-
cific right of the Sixth, then, gives an accused nothing not already
granted in the general protection of due process.
14 Id. at 686.
15 Id. at 696.
16 Id. at 687.
17 Id. at 700.
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D. INCORPORATION AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
Both Mllu'Min and Strickland make particular provisions of the
Sixth Amendment superfluous. Neither opinion explores the rea-
son that a due process standard should control Sixth Amendment
analyses, but the explanation might be found in the history of the
Bill of Rights' application to the states. From 1932, when the
Supreme Court first held that the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment restricted a state's exercise of its criminal justice
power, until the 1960's, when the Supreme Court selectively incor-
porated specific provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment, only the general notion of due process limited the
state power.1 8 Due process, as Betts v. Brady 19 indicated, contained
fewer protections than the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 20
Incorporation changed this. When the Supreme Court held that a
particular provision of the Bill of Rights was incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, it was holding that
the commands of that provision applied to the states in the same
way as they are applied to the federal government. 21 The states
were constrained after incorporation not merely by the generalities
18 Until the Reconstruction Amendments were adopted, the Constitution placed no
limitations on state criminal justice powers. See Martin Bahl, Comment, The Sixth Amend-
ment as Constitutional Theory: Does Originalism Require that Massiah Be Abandoned?, 82 J. OF
CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 423, 425 (1991):
For nearly eighty years after the Constitution was ratified, no federal constitutional
limitations on the states' administration of criminal justice were recognized; the Bill
of Rights only constrained the actions of the federal government. The Reconstruc-
tion amendments... altered the relationship between the federal government and
the states, because, for the first time, national constitutional protection was pro-
vided fundamental individual rights against state aggression.
It was another six decades before the Supreme Court first held that the Fourteenth
Amendment constrained state criminal authority. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932). See Bahl, supra at 426 ("for the first sixty years of the Fourteenth Amendment's
existence, all claims of infringement on individual rights by a state's criminal procedures
were rejected.")
19 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
20 See Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren
Court, 75 MIcH. L. REv. 1319, 1326-27 (1977):
Prior to the 1960's, the Supreme Court had held that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment .. .afforded to state defendants some of the guarantees
contained in the Bill of Rights. The Court also had held, however, that those guar-
antees did not necessarily have the same content in their application to state pro-
ceedings under the Fourteenth Amendment as they had in their application to
federal criminal proceedings under the Bill of Rights. The Fourteenth Amendment
due process clause applied only to rights deemed to be "fundamental" to the
achievement of justice. While a particular guarantee found in the Bill of Rights,
such as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel... could be viewed as fundamental,
application of its full content ordinarily would not be necessary to achieve funda-
mental fairness.
21 See id. at 1327 ("Under [the selective incorporation] doctrine, once it is decided
that a particular guarantee is fundamental, that guarantee is incorporated into the Four-
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of due process, which offered less protection than the specific pre-
scriptions and proscriptions of the Bill of Rights, but by the more
expansive, explicit guarantees instead.
Once the decision to incorporate a definite right was made,
many determinations about that right were relatively easy. If the
right had been fully explicated in the federal context, the guarantee
was simply applied to the states in the same way as it was in federal
trials.2 2 When, however, the federal right had not yet been clarified
and the Court had only considered analogous cases from state pro-
ceedings, the situation became more complex. Although those early
precedents were interpreting only the Due Process Clause, cases af-
ter incorporation sometimes relied on the previous decisions as if
they had defined specific Bill of Rights guarantees. When this was
done without a careful analysis of the differences between due pro-
cess and the specific protections, a blurring of the separate provi-
sions resulted.
This model fits the Court's cases like Mu'Min concerning voir
dire and publicity. Those decisions have never clearly distinguished
between the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and the
related due process concern.
E. VOIR DIRE, PUBLICITY, AND AN IMPARTIAL JURY
In 1968, the Supreme Court first held that the jury trial provi-
sion of the Sixth Amendment was incorporated and applied directly
to the states.23 Seven years earlier, however, the Court in Irvin v.
Dowd 24 had reversed a state conviction because the publicity about
the crime had prevented the selection of an impartial jury.
Although the Court was then formally interpreting only due pro-
cess, it seemed to equate the Sixth Amendment's impartial jury right
with the related due process concern: "In essence, the right to jury
trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of
teenth Amendment 'whole and intact' and is enforced against the states by the same
standards applied to the federal government.")
22 See id. at 1329:
Once that decision [to incorporate a right] was reached, the issue before the Court
could readily be resolved in the defendant's favor by referring to prior decisions
applying the particular right in federal proceedings. Thus, in Gideon [v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963)), once the Court decided that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel was fully incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment, it could readily re-
solve the issue of providing appointed counsel for an indigent state felony defend-
ant by reference to Johnson v. Zerbst, [304 U.S. 458 (1938)], where the Court had
held that the Sixth Amendment right required such an appointment in all federal
felony prosecutions.
23 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
24 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
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impartial, 'indifferent'jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair
hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process." 25
Due process requires a fair hearing, and a fair hearing requires
impartial jurors. Thus, due process requires impartial jurors. That,
at least, was the formal logic, but it is easy to read the opinion with
its stress on the necessity for impartial jurors and assume that Irvin
was discussing the Sixth Amendment.
Murphy v. Florida26 apparently made that assumption. Murphy,
decided after the jury trial clause was incorporated, affirmed a state
conviction over the claim that pretrial publicity made that verdict
unconstitutional. Even though at the time of Murphy the Sixth
Amendment and not just due process could be used to measure the
state proceeding, the Court simply adopted Irvin's language of im-
partial, indifferent jurors without any discussion of whether the in-
tervening jury incorporation decision compelled any different or
additional analysis. 27 Without a consideration of the distinctions, if
any, between the Sixth Amendment right and due process, the two
inevitably got blurred together. MuMin indicates this by citing Mur-
phy for the proposition that the accused could only succeed if the
rejection of the voir dire questions "render[ed] the defendant's trial
fundamentally unfair."'28
In addition to cases concerning the effect of publicity on impar-
tial juries, MuMin also relied on decisions determining whether the
Constitution required specific voir dire questions to be asked of po-
tential jurors. This line of cases, too, has not analyzed the distinc-
tions, if any, between the Sixth Amendment guarantee and the
related due process concern. Ham v. South Carolina,29 the first such
case, reversed a conviction because the trial court refused to ask
prospective jurors about their possible racial bias concerning the ac-
cused. Although the case was decided in 1973, well after the jury
trial provision of the Sixth Amendment was incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court, through then Justice Rehnquist,
did not mention the impartial jury provision of the Sixth Amend-
25 Id. at 722.
26 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
27 Id. at 799. Similarly a decade later in Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984), the
Court, in considering again the effects of publicity on a state criminal conviction, framed
the issue as whether "pretrial publicity so infected a state criminal trial as to deny the
defendant his Sixth Amendment right to an 'impartial jury.' " Id. at 1026. The Court,
however, then went on to discuss and distinguish Irvin without any discussion whether a
Sixth Amendment analysis which the Court said it was doing and the due process analy-
sis of Irvin differed.
28 Mu' Min v. Virginia, II1 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (1991).
29 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
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ment. Ham, instead, merely concluded that "the essential fairness
required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that under the facts shown by this record the petitioner be
permitted to have the jurors interrogated on the issue of racial
bias."
A few years later, the Court in Ristaino v. Ross,30 again con-
fronted the question of whether the Constitution required the ask-
ing of specific voir dire questions. This case continued the melding
of the Sixth Amendment into due process as the Court without anal-
ysis indicated that the due process and a Sixth Amendment analysis
were the same: "A criminal defendant in a state court is guaranteed
an 'impartial jury' by the Sixth Amendment as applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment.... Principles of due
process also guarantee a defendant an impartial jury."3 1
As these converging lines of precedent indicate, Mu'Mn "s adop-
tion of a due process test to decide a Sixth Amendment impartial
jury claim is well supported. The wellspring for MuMin began
before incorporation and cases since that time have eschewed analy-
sis of whether the Sixth Amendment and due process protections
ought to be different.
F. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND INCORPORATION
The effective assistance of counsel jurisprudence might seem to
fit the same pattern. 32 The Court's mention of this right can be
traced back to Powell v. Alabama 33 and, therefore, to a time before
the right to counsel provision was made applicable to the states.3 4
On closer examination, however, this rationalization does not ex-
plain why the effective assistance of counsel guarantee has been
made superfluous by due process. While the initial allusions to this
right preceded incorporation, the Court did not truly grapple with
the meaning of effective assistance until recently, as Strickland v.
30 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
31 Id. at 595 n.6. On the facts presented, Ristaino held that the voir dire questions
were not constitutionally required. See also Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 n.9 (1986)
("The right of an impartial jury is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment, made ap-
plicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and by principles of due
process.").
32 Cf. Bahl, supra note 18, at 425 ("The doctrinal history of the constitutional right to
counsel largely has been shaped by the vicissitudes of selective incorporation.")
33 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See Thomas Hagel, Toward a Uniform Statutory Standardfor Effec-
tive Assistance of Counsel" A Right in Search of Definition after Strickland, 17 Loy. U. CH. LJ.
203, 204 (1986) ("The Supreme Court first articulated a constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel in Powell v. Alabama ....").
34 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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Washington recognized. 35 Mu'Min's submersion of a Sixth Amend-
ment right into due process might stem from the twisting constitu-
tional path that has constrained state powers in criminal cases, but
that history did not cause the similar submersion by Strickland. In-
stead, Strickland's result could have been produced only by the mod-
ern Court's views about the Sixth Amendment.
G. COMPULSORY PROCESS AND DUE PROCESS
A recent interpretation of the compulsory process clause rein-
forces the conclusion that the modern Court's jurisprudence alone
makes specific Sixth Amendment guarantees superfluous. Unlike
the impartial jury provision and the right to effective assistance of
counsel, the Court had almost never considered compulsory process
claims in either the federal or state context before 1967 when the
right was made applicable to the states.3 6 Even though pre-incorpo-
ration history cannot explain the result, the Court in Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie37 interpreted compulsory process so that it, too, offered no
more protection than the general due process provisions.
Ritchie, charged with sexually abusing his daughter, contended
that his constitutional rights were violated because neither he nor
his attorney was allowed access to the records of Children and
Youth Services, a state agency that investigated claims that he had
mistreated his children. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in find-
ing for the accused, held that the state thereby had violated Ritchie's
compulsory process right.38 The Supreme Court, however, saw no
need to follow this lead. Without analysis or citation, the Court sim-
ply pronounced that general due process offered Ritchie at least as
much protection as that Sixth Amendment guarantee.
35 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 683 (1984) ("The petition presents a
type of Sixth Amendment claim that this Court has not previously considered in any
generality."). In Powell, the Court held that due process required the appointment of
counsel in state capital cases and that "(this) duty is not discharged by an assignment at
such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the
preparation and trial of the case." 287 U.S. at 71. The Court did not explain what it
meant by "effective aid." For the development of the notion of effective assistance of
counsel from Powell to Strickland, see Hagel, supra note 33, at 204-07.
36 In 1986, the Supreme Court stated, "This Court has had little occasion to discuss
the contours of the Compulsory Process Clause." Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39,
55 (1986). Ritchie also noted, "The pre-1967 cases that mention compulsory process do
not provide an extensive analysis of the Clause." Id. at 55 n.12. Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1967), held that the compulsory process clause applied to the states.
37 480 U.S. 39 (1986).
38 "The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Ritchie, through his lawyer, has the
right to examine the full contents of the CYS records. The court found that this right of
access is required by both the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory Process
Clause." Id. at 51.
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Because the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to this type of case
is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth Amendment precedents ad-
dressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish a clear framework
for review, we adopt a due process analysis for purposes of this case.
Although we conclude that compulsory process provides no greater
protections in this area than afforded by due process, we need not de-
cide today whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory Process
Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is enough
to conclude that on these facts, Ritchie's claims more properly are con-
sidered by reference to due process.8 9
Although Ritchie claimed, and the state court had found, a vio-
lation of his Sixth Amendment right, he, like Mu'Min and Washing-
ton, could enforce this right only by first establishing a violation of
due process. Once again, the Sixth Amendment had no independ-
ent force and was made superfluous by due process.
III. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT As AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE BILL
OF RIGHTS
Not all Sixth Amendment cases submerge that amendment's
specific protections into the general waters of due process, 40 but the
39 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56. The Court preceded this conclusion by stating:
This Court has never squarely held that the Compulsory Process Clause guarantees
the right to discover the identity of witnesses, or to require the government to pro-
duce exculpatory evidence.... Instead, the Court traditionally has evaluated claims
such as those raised by Ritchie under the broader protections of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
40 Speedy trial disputes could be resolved in much the same fashion as effective
assistance or impartial juror claims. The standard could require the determination of
whether the delay caused a fundamentally unfair trial. If so, of course, this specific Sixth
Amendment protection would also become engulfed by due process. The Supreme
Court, however, has adopted a much different test-one that requires balancing
"[length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
The Court has not employed what is essentially a due process test for the speedy
trial right because the Court has recognized that this Sixth Amendment guarantee serves
important goals other than impairment of the defense: "The Sixth Amendment right to
a speedy trial is ... not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by
passage of time; that interest is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by
statutes of limitations." United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982). See also
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971): "Inordinate delay between arrest,
indictment, and trial may impair a defendant's ability to present an effective defense.
But the major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from
the actual or possible prejudice to an accused's defense."
MacDonald went on to state, "The speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize
the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but neverthe-
less substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and
to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved crimi-
nal charges." 456 U.S. at 8. Cf. United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312 (1986)
("the Speedy Trial Clause's core concern is impairment of liberty .... ) Consequently,
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view that makes the Sixth Amendment superfluous is prevalent. It
has been used to define a number of those guarantees over a consid-
erable period of time. Is that approach correct? Can a due process
analysis simply be dropped a rung in the Bill of Rights to define the
contents of the Sixth Amendment?
An interpretation that makes specific rights redundant-a read-
ing that a person can only receive protection under a provision by
concomitantly showing protection under another provision-ought
to be suspect. Why are there Sixth Amendment rights to an impar-
tial jury and effective assistance of counsel and compulsory process
if a due process violation must be shown to have them enforced?
What is the point to a specific Sixth Amendment right if it does
nothing beyond the restrictions of due process? Why was there a
struggle over incorporation if the explicit provisions of the Sixth
guranteed nothing not already protected by due process?
Each part of the Bill of Rights ought to serve a function. In-
deed, "it is difficult to imagine anything more at odds with a
framer's intention than that the constitutional provision she has just
helped to enact will be meaningless and unenforced." 41 If the spe-
cific provisions of the Sixth Amendment are to be meaningful and
enforced, then, they must do something in addition to or different
from what the Due Process Clause already does. Since due process
clearly entitles the accused to a fundamentally fair trial, Sixth
Amendment protections must offer something more or something
other than this fairness. In trying to determine what that more or
other is, in trying to develop a meaningful Sixth Amendment, sev-
eral principles should be consistently applied.
First, the Sixth Amendment is not isolated and should not be
treated in isolation. It has a context and that context is the Bill of
Rights as a whole. Unless interpretations of the Sixth Amendment
properly consider the connections and contrasts with the rest of the
Bill of Rights, those readings are likely to be misinformed. While
this proposition may seem obvious, it has seldom been followed.42
a speedy trial claimant, to be successful, not only does not have to show that a trial was
fundamentally unfair, he does not even have to show prejudice. Moore v. Arizona, 414
U.S. 25 (1973), expressly rejected the contention that a showing of prejudice was essen-
tial for a successful speedy trial claim. Moore also stated, "Moreover, prejudice to a de-
fendant caused by delay in bringing him to trial is not confined to the possible prejudice
to his defense in those proceedings." Id. at 26-7. Cf. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39,49-
50 (1984)(noting "[t]he consistent view of the lower federal courts that the defendant
should not be required to prove specific prejudice in order to obtain relief for a violation
of the public-trial guarantee . . ." and concluding, "We agree with that view .....
41 Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Bork's Dilemma, 76 VA. L. REv. 337, 342 (1990).
42 Cf. Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131, 1132
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If it were, the Sixth Amendment would be seen as having a central
role in our constitutional structure. The Sixth Amendment is at the
heart of an integrated Bill of Rights because its jury trial guarantee
contains the paradigmatic right of the first ten amendments.
A. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
The importance of juries to the generation that drafted the
Constitution can hardly be overstated. Immediately after indepen-
dence all the states placed a jury trial protection in their constitu-
tions. Indeed, the guarantee of a jury trial in criminal cases was the
only right granted in all the state constitutions adopted before
1787.43
Professor Amar has contended that juries were seen as a crucial
cornerstone in the edifice that allowed the common person to con-
trol government.
Spanning both civil and criminal proceedings, the key role of the jury
was to protect ordinary individuals against governmental overreach-
ing. Jurors would be drawn from the community; like the militia they
were ordinary Citizens, not permanent government officials on the
government payroll. Just as the militia could check a paid professional
(1991)("To my knowledge no legal academic in the twentieth century has attempted to
write in any comprehensive way about the Bill of Rights as a whole. So too, today's
scholars rarely consider the rich interplay between the original Constitution and the Bill
of Rights.").
Professor Amar attempts to do that and challenges the conventional wisdom that
the Bill of Rights was largely designed to protect individual and minority rights against
the majorities. He concludes:
Of course, individual and minority rights did constitute a motif of the Bill of
Rights-but not the sole, or even dominant, motif. A close look at the Bill reveals
structural ideas tightly interconnected with language of rights; states' rights and
majority rights alongside individual and minority rights; and protection of various
intermediate associations--church, militia, and jury-designed to create an edu-
cated and virtuous electorate. The main thrust of the Bill was not to downplay or-
ganizational structure, but do deploy it; not to impede popular majorities, but to
empower them.
Id. See also Howard W. Gutman, Academic Determinism: The Division of the Bill of Rights, 54
S. CAL. L. REv. 295, 327-29 (1981):
Despite the fact that the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, has been the
ultimate authority regulating the relation between the State and its citizens for
nearly two hundred years, these ten amendments have virtually never been studied
and taught together, within one compartment and by one category of specialists....
Part of the explanation behind the failure to study the Bill of Rights as a whole is
that, for the past eighty years, parts of the Bill of Rights have not been studied at all.
... The more important reason for the failure to study the Bill of Rights as a unit
... is that parts of the Bill of Rights have been characterized differently and there-
fore divided into separate compartments. The jury trial clause of the seventh
amendment has been characterized as part of the trial process within the study of
Civil and Criminal Procedure. The compulsory process and confrontation clauses
have also been characterized as part of the trial process, but within the bounds of
Evidence.
43 LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 227 (1985).
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standing army, so too the jury could thwart overreaching by powerful
and ambitious government officials. 44
The prominence of juries in the constitutional scheme is per-
haps best indicated by the fact that they are specifically granted in
three amendments, while concerns about juries affected other
amendments. 45 And, of course, the core of the Sixth Amendment is
the right to jury trials in criminal cases. 4 6
This recognition of the Sixth Amendment's central role should
shape its interpretation. A central role is not granted by niggardly
readings. The intended centrality is denied by results that sub-
merge Sixth Amendment guarantees into due process. Instead, it
44 Amar, supra note 42, at 1183. See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530
(1975) ("The purpose of the jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power-to
make available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the
overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps
overconditioned or biased response of a judge."). Cf. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66, 72 (1970):
([T]he primary purpose of the jury is to prevent the possibility of oppression by the
Government; the jury interposes between the accused and his accuser the judgment
of laymen who are less tutored perhaps than a judge or panel ofjudges, but who at
the same time are less likely to function or appear as but another arm of the Gov-
ernment that has proceeded against him.)
Professor Amar has argued that an integrated examination of the Bill of Rights
reveals that the dominant motif was not the protection of individual or minority rights,
but was the empowerment of majorities to control the federal government and that ju-
ries played a crucial role in this scheme.
[T]he Bill of Rights protected the ability of local governments to monitor and deter
federal abuse, ensured that ordinary citizens would participate in the federal admin-
istration ofjustice through various jury-trial provisions, and preserved the transcen-
dent sovereign right of a majority of the people themselves to alter or abolish
government and thereby pronounce the last word on constitutional questions.
Amar, supra note 42, at 1133.
45 See Amar, supra note 42, at 1183("Guaranteed in no less than three amendments,
juries were at the heart of the Bill of Rights. The Fifth safeguarded the role of the grand
jury; the Sixth, the criminal petit jury; and the Seventh, the civil jury.")
According to Amar's analysis, the central role ofjuries is also indicated because of
the effect juries had on other amendments.
Not only was [the jury] featured in three separate amendments .... but its absence
strongly influenced the judge-restricting doctrines underlying three other amend-
ments (the First, Fourth, and Eighth). So too, the double jeopardy clause, which
makes no explicit mention ofjuries, should be understood to safeguard not simply
the individual defendant's interest in avoiding vexation, but also the integrity of the
initial petitjury's judgment.... The due process clause also implicated the jury, for
its core meaning was to require lawful indictment or presentment.
Id. at 1190.
46 The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation: to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
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can best be accomplished, of course, by expansive readings of the
Sixth Amendment.47
B. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AS FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEES
A court viewing the Sixth Amendment as part of an integrated
Bill of Rights would also have to confront whether the standards
that have been applied to other constitutional rights should also be
applied to the Sixth Amendment. The impartial juror right inter-
preted in Mu'Mn provides an illustration of what this might mean.
Placed in its proper perspective, the jury required by the Sixth
47 A number of other reasons also appear supporting an expansive reading of the
Sixth Amendment when it is contrasted with other Bill of Rights provisions. For exam-
ple, the contemporary Supreme Court has "repeatedly cited the importance of accurate
adjudication as a reason to interpret restrictively rights that can be called 'truth-impair-
ing,' that is, rights withholding relevant evidence of guilt from the adjudicative process."
Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1369, 1370 (1991). Rights that are not truth-impairing, then, must be interpreted more
liberally. Cf. id. at 1370-71 ("This logic implies that the Court should broadly construe
rights that put exculpatory evidence before juries and that the Court has itself described
as 'truth-furthering.' "). Since the Sixth Amendment guarantees of counsel, confronta-
tion, and compulsory process can all be considered part of a right to present exculpatory
evidence, see id. at 1373 n. 11, these rights should be read expansively.
The contrast with what has been described by ProfessorJoseph D. Grano as "pro-
phylactic constitutional rules" also supports an expansive reading of the Sixth Amend-
ment. "A prophylactic constitutional rule ... is a rule that functions as a preventive
safeguard to insure that constitutional violations will not occur. What distinguishes a
prophylactic rule from a true constitutional rule is the possibility of violating the former
without actually violating the Constitution." Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Crimi-
nal Procedure: A Question ofArtice III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100, 105 (1985). As an
example, Grano gives the warnings mandated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). Grano, supra at 106-11.
Rights stemming directly from the Constitution, then, should be read more expan-
sively than rights coming out of such prophylactic rules. An infringement of a provision
like the right to counsel or an impartial jury is a direct constitutional violation, as Grano
recognizes:
[T]he primary purpose of [the] right [to counsel] is to assure the defendant a fair
trial. Yet denial of counsel at trial is unconstitutional even if the trial is otherwise
fair.... [O]nce the Court determines that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
applicable, a trial in derogation of that right is unconstitutional even though it is
otherwise fair.
Id. at 115-18. Indeed, the Court has resisted adopting what might be seen as prophylac-
tic Sixth Amendment rules. For example, in deciding what is constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel, the Court adopted a general test ("whether counsel's assistance
was reasonable considering all the circumstances") and refused to require any specifi-
cally enunciated duties. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) ("Prevail-
ing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like...
are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides.").
Similarly, in adopting a four-part balancing test for determining Sixth Amendment
speedy trial claims, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972), first rejected the "sug-
gestion ... that we hold that the Constitution requires a criminal defendant to be of-
fered a trial within a specified time period."
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Amendment is not just a factfinding device, but an essential part of
the constitutional structure inhibiting governmental overreaching. 48
This structure mandates not just any jury, but a jury with certain
attributes. Thus, the founders required localjurors.49 Localjurors,
however, also present a special danger because they might have in-
formation which could be misused. Consequently, "impartial"
found its way into the Sixth Amendment:
[T]he draftsmen of the Sixth Amendment were concerned about the
possible abuse of personal knowledge of the case by the jurors.
Hence, the Sixth Amendment was drafted to provide that the jury be
"impartial" and that witnesses be confronted .... The ... demand is
that the jurors be impartial and decide the case on the evidence
presented during the trial .... 50
Seen this way, the impartial juror requirement functions much
as other provisions do that are part of the fundamental checks and
48 Accurate factfinding, of course, can help check overreaching by the government.
Cf. Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 79 (1977) ("While ascertainment of
truth may not be the only, or primary, goal of a criminal trial, assuredly if the trial is to
be perceived as a rational process, then the ascertainment of truth must be a highly
valued goal."). Factfinding, however, was only one function of the jury in our constitu-
tional structure. Juries were mandated "to find the facts, to apply the law to the facts,
and to serve as the conscience of the community." Id. at 75. The last two are
interrelated:
Unless the jury applies the law to the facts so as to articulate the community sense of
justice, there is justifiable fear that thejury will not feel responsibility for the verdict
rendered. Unless the jury renders a verdict in which the community sense ofjustice
is articulated, an accused may not feel that he has been judged, but rather may feel
he has been processed. Although expertise, uniformity, and certainty are worth-
while goals for a legal system, assuredly these goals must be of lesser importance
than the goal of an articulation of the community sense of justice in a criminal
verdict.
Id. at 83.
49 See Amar, supra note 42, at 1186:
The jury was not simply a popular body, but a local one as well. Indeed, the Sixth
Amendment explicitly guaranteed a jury 'of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed,' going a step beyond the language of Article III, which
required only that jury trials be held somewhere within the state were the crime oc-
curred .... Just as state legislators could protect their constituents against central
oppression, so too jurors could obviously 'interpose' themselves against central tyr-
anny through the devices of presentments, nonindictments, and general verdicts.
As with the militia, the jury would be composed of Citizens from the same commu-
nity and its actions were expected to be informed by community values.
See also Kershen, supra note 48, at 75-94 (discussing how local jurors serve the purposes
of the jury better than other jurors).
For similar reasons, trials also had to be public:
Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his trial be conducted in
public may confer upon our society, the guarantee has always been recognized as a
safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution.
The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the
forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse ofjudicial power.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
50 Kershen, supra note 48, at 77.
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balances placed into our constitutional structure. If this right is fun-
damental, should it be measured by standards different from those
by which other essential guarantees are measured?51 The crucial is-
sue might be whether a "strict scrutiny," or "compelling state inter-
est," or a "least restrictive alternative" test should be used to decide
Sixth Amendment disputes just as such formulations are used to as-
sess other constitutional claims.52 If such tests were used, the Court
would have to address very different questions from those that it has
addressed in deciding a Sixth Amendment case like MuMin. There
the Court decided whether the trial judge's refusal to make the voir
dire inquiry denied the accused a fair trial. If this Sixth Amendment
issue had been seen as other constitutional issues are, however, the
Court might instead have asked whether there was a compelling
state interest in the refusal of the voir dire questions? Whatever the
right answer might be to that question in a particular case, its use as
a controlling standard would greatly change the Sixth Amendment
because it is a question fundamentally different from the due pro-
cess standard of whether a trial was fair. If this kind of question had
51 See Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State's Right to a Fair Trial, 60
S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1056 (1987) ("For reasons that are not apparent, the field of con-
stitutional criminal procedure has not always incorporated the modes of analysis gener-
ally employed in constitutional cases.").
52 Professor Bandes maintains that the strict scrutiny test applied to other constitu-
tional rights is not, but ought to be, applied to the criminal procedure rights:
The strict scrutiny standard ofjudicial review is the appropriate standard for evalu-
ating state rules or enactments which are alleged to burden the fundamental trial-
related rights of those accused of crimes. The strict scrutiny test is familiar: it de-
mands that when political choices burden fundamental rights, the means employed
must be the least restrictive available to achieve the desired end. Additionally, the
ends themselves must be sufficiently compelling to justify infringement. To a
troubling degree, the strict scrutiny test is not used to evaluate state rules which are
alleged to burden fundamental criminal rights.
Id. at 1050-51. See also Gutman, supra note 42, at 344, who first concludes that the domi-
nant test in the Bill of Rights requires "a compelling state interest and the nonexistence
of less restrictive means before a state can abridge an individual's rights." He then
notes about one specific Sixth Amendment right:
Although by its terms the guarantee of confrontation seems as fundamental today as
the right to speech, religion, association, nondiscrimination and the host of inter-
ests grouped under substantive due process, no scholar or judge has ever suggested
reliance on the compelling state interest test to assess the constitutional validity of
abridgements of the right of confrontation. Even conceding arguendo that the right
of confrontation is less fundamental than the other interests, no court or writer has
ever applied the minimum rationality test, currently employed in mediating the
state's interest with regard to less fundamental interests.
Id. at 344-45. After surveying how the standards for confrontation deviate from the
more usual constitutional tests, Gutman concludes, "The mediation of conflicting con-
stitutional rights and governmental interests is never easy; yet, the 'hard' question of
mediating the right to confrontation and the state's interest cannot even be pondered
until the issue is constitutionally framed." Id. at 347.
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controlling status, Sixth Amendment guarantees would not neces-
sarily be submerged into due process.
C. THE AFFIRMATIVE NATURE OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
While a proper constitutional interpretation would acknowl-
edge that the Sixth Amendment plays a central role in the structure
of the Bill of Rights, it would also need to recognize that the Sixth
Amendment has important characteristics that set it apart. Most im-
portant among these is that the Sixth Amendment is not a collection
of negatives restraining government, but consists of a series of posi-
tive guarantees.
A dominant constitutional theory maintains that the Constitu-
tion does not require the government to act, but only curbs the gov-
ernment from acting wrongly. As Judge Posner has stated, the
Constitution
is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.... The men who
wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that Government might
do too little for the people but that it might do too much to them. The
Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868 at the height of laissez-faire
thinking, sought to protect Americans from oppression by state gov-
ernment, not to secure them basic governmental services. 53
This distinction between positive and negative rights drives due
process analyses. Chief Justice Rehnquist asserts, "[T]he Due Pro-
cess Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental
aid...." 54
The Sixth Amendment, however, is different; it affirmatively
grants rights. Certainly its wording, at least when contrasted with
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, indicates the
Sixth Amendment's positive nature. While that due process provi-
sion is stated negatively, "nor shall any State" deprive,55 the Sixth
53 Jackson v. City ofJoliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049
(1983). See also Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MIcH. L. REV.
2271, 2272 (1990):
No inquiry is more central to constitutional jurisprudence than the effort to deline-
ate the duties of government. The courts' approach to this complex subject has
been dominated by reliance on a simple distinction between affirmative and nega-
tive responsibilities. Government is held solely to what courts characterize as a neg-
ative obligation: to refrain from acts that deprive citizens of protected rights.
Obligations that courts conceive to be affirmative - duties to act, to provide or to
protect - are not enforceable constitutional rights.
54 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 196
(1989).
55 See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 864,
865 (1986):
Like so many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, from which it was copied, the
due process clause is phrased as a prohibition, not an affirmative command: "nor
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Amendment is stated affirmatively, "the accused shall enjoy." 56
Furthermore, an examination of the constituent parts of the
Sixth Amendment clearly reveals that they are not negative liberties.
For example, no one suggests that the proper way to interpret the
impartial jury requirement is for the government to tell the accused,
You are entitled to a trial decided by impartial jurors. We won't
stand in your way in finding them. If you round them up, you can
have such a trial. If you don't produce this group, however, since
we have not deprived you of the right, you can be validly tried under
the Sixth Amendment without impartial jurors.
This argument is not advanced because the right to a jury is
obviously an affirmative grant to the accused. The question is not
whether the prosecutor or some other instrument of the state did
something to deny a trial by jury; rather, the question is whether the
accused did in fact get the mandated jury trial. The jury trial guar-
antee is a positive right.57
Compulsory process also illustrates this. Compulsory process
does not merely forbid governmental interference with the ac-
cused's attempt to produce his witnesses. Instead, this provision en-
ables the accused to call on the coercive power of the state to enable
him to produce witnesses in his favor. An affirmative right forces
the government to act, and that is precisely the essence of compul-
sory process.58
shall any State" is the equivalent of "a State shall not." Moreover, what the states
are forbidden to do is to "deprive" people of certain things, and depriving suggests
aggressive state activity, not mere failure to help.
Currie goes on to conclude, "[G]iven the absence of evidence in the debates, it is hard to
believe the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to have a radi-
cally different effect from that of the fifth."). Id. at 866.
56 See id. at 873-74, noting the affirmative nature of the Sixth Amendment's right to
counsel guarantee and contrasts its language with that of other constitutional rights.
"The due process clauses explicitly require government deprivation, the first amend-
ment requires government abridgement; the 'right' to assistance of counsel is not so
negatively phrased."
57 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968) ("[I]n the American
States, as in the federal judicial system, a general grant ofjury trial for serious offenses is
a fundamental right .... ").
58 Instead of labelling the Sixth Amendment components as affirmative rights of the
accused, the amendment could be said to place duties on the government. For example,
compulsory process places a duty on the government to assist the accused in producing
witnesses. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527 (1972) ("A defendant has no duty to
bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial
is consistent with due process.")
This alternative phrasing, however, states nothing different than that the Sixth
Amendment affirmatively grants rights to the accused. If a constitutional provision
places a duty on the government to give the accused something, such as ajury trial, then
the right is fundamentally different than one that just restrains governmental behavior.
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Perhaps the Court's most striking recognition of the positive
nature of a Sixth Amendment provision has been in the right to
counsel area. As Gideon establishes, the Sixth Amendment is vio-
lated not just when the government prevents the accused from be-
ing represented by an attorney, but also when the accused who
cannot afford a lawyer is not furnished one. 59 If the government is
going to prosecute, it must act affirmatively to make sure that the
indigent is represented by competent counsel.60
As these rights illustrate, and as a comprehensive examination
would confirm, 6 1 the Sixth Amendment is a collection of affirmative
rights.62 The positive nature of the Sixth makes it fundamentally
different from due process,63 and this elemental difference should
59 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (precedents, reason, and reflec-
tion "require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him."). See Currie, supra note 55, at 873 ("The Court has long
held that (the right to counsel] imposes an affirmative duty on the government to pro-
vide legal assistance if the defendant cannot afford it.").
60 Even though Gideon has been limited so that indigents charged with misdemeanors
and not sentenced to jail are not entitled to the appointment of counsel, See Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); the point remains:
when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies, it is not merely a restraint on gov-
ernment, but an affirmative grant to the accused.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of a component of the counsel guarantee, the
right to effective assistance of counsel, further illustrates that point. "Government vio-
lates the right to effective assistance when it interferes in certain ways with the ability of
counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense.... Counsel,
however, can also deprive a defendant of the right to effective assistance, simply by fail-
ing to render 'adequate legal assistance.'" Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686
(1984) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)). The accused is entitled to
effective assistance even if the government was not the cause of the ineffective
assistance.
61 See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948) (referring to the "accepted practice
of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused .... ).
62 Cf. Bandes, supra note 53, at 2276 ("Some constitutional provisions clearly man-
date affirmative governmental conduct. For example, the Sixth Amendment requires
government to provide an accused a speedy public trial, compulsory process, assistance
of counsel, and the opportunity to be informed of the nature of the accusation and con-
fronted with the witnesses against him."). See also Currie, supra note 55, at 874 n.57
("The right to counsel also appears in tandem with other 'rights,' such as those to com-
pulsory process and a jury trial, which unmistakably require affirmative action .... ").
63 These affirmative rights could be phrased as a restraint on government; that is, the
state is prevented from convicting an accused unless the accused has a jury trial, a law-
yer, been given notice, and so forth. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344
(1980) ("The right to counsel prevents the States from conducting trials at which per-
sons who face incarceration must defend themselves without adequate legal assist-
ance.") Cf. Currie, supra note 55, at 874 ("[T]o characterize the right to assigned
counsel as involving an affirmative government duty is to look at only a part of the trans-
action. In convicting an individual of crime, the government reaches out to deprive him
of life, liberty, or property by execution, jail, or fine.").
Although semantics allow a negative phrasing of the Sixth Amendment, these rights
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lead to different standards for due process and the Sixth Amend-
ment. In other words, a consistent and meaningful constitutional
interpretation cannot just submerge the Sixth Amendment into due
process. The negative guarantee of the Fifth and Fourteenth simply
cannot make superfluous the affirmative rights of the Sixth.
D. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AS PERSONAL RIGHTS
A meaningful Sixth Amendment jurisprudence must also recog-
nize that the Sixth Amendment grants personal rights in addition to
affirmative rights. While the Sixth Amendment may be a central
facet of a constitutional structure that protects all of us from govern-
mental overreaching, the Sixth does this not by granting a right to
society or even a collective right. It, instead, grants a right directly
to the accused, and the accused only, as its explicit language indi-
cates-"'the accused shall enjoy." 64 Just as interpretations should give
effect to the Sixth Amendment's central role and to its construct as a
collection of affirmative guarantees, the analyses should also give
effect to its construct as personal rights of the accused. When the
Sixth Amendment is interpreted to grant the accused nothing dis-
are not restraints focusing on what the government did, as Cuyler itself indicates. Cuyler
considered whether different standards for retained and appointed counsel should de-
termine ineffectiveness of counsel. Since the state plays a greater role when counsel is
appointed than when counsel is privately retained, a governmental restraint model
should lead to stricter standards for appointed counsel. If effective assistance of counsel
is an affirmative grant to the accused, the appointed or retained status of counsel does
not matter. The Court correctly treated effective assistance as an affirmative right.
"Since the State's conduct of a criminal trial itself implicates the State in the defendant's
conviction, we see no basis for drawing a distinction between retained and appointed
counsel that would deny equal justice to defendants who must choose their own law-
yers." Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 344-45.
Once the state has chosen to prosecute, the Sixth Amendment affirmatively grants
rights to the accused. These protections do not come into play until the person be-
comes an accused. Indeed, they could not. We can have an omnipresent right to free
speech, but an ever-present right to ajury trial makes no sense. Ajury trial right is only
meaningful in a dispute-resolution context. The Sixth Amendment puts no restraints on
the government before a person becomes accused. After the person becomes an ac-
cused, the Sixth Amendment grants affirmative rights. For example, the speedy trial
right begins when a person becomes accused in the criminal process. United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) ("[I]t is either a formal indictment or information or
else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that
engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amend-
ment.") Before the Sixth Amendment trial right applies, a person is only protected by
due process. Id. at 325.
64 See, e.g, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979) ("Our cases have
uniformly recognized the public trial guarantee as one created for the benefit of the
defendant.") Cf. Amar, supra note 42, at 1175 (contending that the use of the terms "the
people" or "the militia" in the Constitution indicated collective rights, while use of the
terms "man" or "person" indicated individual rights.). U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
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tinct from what others are entitled to, then part of the Sixth Amend-
ment disappears.65
Analyses like MuMin's do not recognize the personal and af-
firmative natures of the Sixth Amendment. MuMin found that the
right to an impartial jury was not violated because the failure to ask
the voir dire questions did not prevent a fundamentally unfair trial.
The issue for the Sixth Amendment, however, was not whether a fair
trial was denied, but instead whether the accused was granted the
personal right to an impartial jury. Even if the resulting trial was
"fair," the Sixth Amendment was violated if an impartial jury did
not decide the case.
Aware of this, a court might recast the issue to ask whether the
rejected voir dire questions were necessary for an impartial jury.
This formulation, however, does not truly treat the right as an af-
firmative one either. When an affirmative guarantee is at stake, is it
sufficient to conclude that the question was not absolutely essential
to assure an impartial jury? The Court's standard essentially re-
quires the accused to demonstrate that his jury was not impartial.
Since, however, this is a right that government must affirmatively
satisfy, if we are in doubt about whether the jury was impartial or
not, the accused should win his claim. Only when the court affirma-
tively concludes that the jury was impartial can the positive, per-
sonal guarantee of the Sixth Amendment be satisfied.
E. THE INTEGRATED PROTECTIONS OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
Finally, just as the Sixth Amendment should be read as part of
an integral Bill of Rights, each Sixth Amendment guarantee should
be interpreted in light of the rest of the Sixth Amendment. Unless
65 The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation has been interpreted so that it is not
a personal right of the accused. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation
Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REv. 557, 580-81 (1988) (alteration added):
According to the Court, [the confrontation clause] merely grants the defendant the
right to the most accurate truth-determining process. Granting the defendant this
right allows him nothing not given the prosecution. The prosecution's only legiti-
mate desire in a criminal trial is to achieve the best truth-determination .... In
asserting his confrontation rights the defendant is no longer claiming a protection
from the prosecution, but is seeking exactly what the prosecution can also claim.
The confrontation clause, in spite of its actual words extending a right to the ac-
cused, no longer expressly safeguards the accused. Instead, it is a protection which
everyone in society, as represented by the prosecutor, can demand.
See also Bandes, supra note 51, at 1045 ("[T]he state cannot claim to represent the ac-
cused's rights. The state can, of course, represent its own interests, but these must be
weighed on their own merits, and not be imbued with the borrowed weight of those of
the accused. The state's interests are distinct from the accused's interests."). Professor
Bandes also notes, "The Constitution makes no mention of the state's right to a fair or
impartial trial." Id. at 1022-23.
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each grant was randomly dropped into the Sixth, the clauses should
not be read in isolation. The individual guarantees, however, do fit
together to serve broader purposes than those served by each sepa-
rately. Thus, the Sixth Amendment does not just grant the accused
a jury trial. It goes on to mandate a local, impartial jury for a trial
that is to be both public and speedy. These are not separable guar-
antees. Instead, they dovetail to construct a forum that will not only
find facts, but will also be a check on governmental overreaching. 66
The Court has also recognized, at least some of the time, that
the remaining provisions-notice, confrontation, compulsory pro-
cess, and assistance of counsel-must also be read together:
The Sixth Amendment includes a compact statement of the rights nec-
essary to a full defense .... [T]hese rights are basic to our adversary
system of criminal justice .... The rights to notice, confrontation, and
compulsory process, when taken together, guarantee that a criminal
charge may be answered in a manner now considered fundamental to
the fair administration of American justice-through the calling and
interrogation of favorable witnesses, the cross-examination of adverse
witnesses, and the orderly introduction of evidence. In short, the
Amendment constitutionalizes the right in an adversary criminal trial
to make a defense as we know it.6 7
If the purpose of this portion of the Sixth Amendment is to
grant the accused an adversary process, 68 then these rights must be
read together:
Defense counsel is necessary for the fair conduct of an adversarial
trial, but an adversarial trial would still be denied if that counsel could
not present favorable witnesses or test adverse evidence. Granting the
accused the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses can be meaning-
less if the accused does not have skilled counsel conduct the question-
ing. An accused can be granted a compulsory process right, but we do
not have our adversary system if the accused does not also have the
right to confront adverse witnesses. All the rights assuring the adver-
sary process must be read together .... 69
66 See supra sections II.E.-G. for how the jury trial, speedy trial, impartial jury, and
local jury requirements all act as checks on governmental overreaching. See also In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948) (A public trial furthers accurate factfinding by increas-
ing the possibility of witnesses coming forward, but in addition "the guarantee has al-
ways been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as
instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to con-
temporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible
abuse of judicial power.").
67 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975).
68 Cf. Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MicH. L. REv. 73, 179 (1974)
("All of the various procedural rights in the Bill of Rights are implicitly designed to
strengthen the adversary posture of the accused. Indeed, in pursuit of their common
end they overlap and complement one another.").
69 Jonakait, supra note 65, at 583.
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Each Sixth Amendment right must be interpreted taking into
consideration its Sixth Amendment context. 70 Such an integrated
view can lead to conclusions different from those reached if each
clause is read as if the rest of the amendment did not exist. An opin-
ion in the Court's most recent confrontation case illustrates this.
In White v. Illinois7 1 the Supreme Court held that the prosecu-
tion did not have to show the unavailability of the declarant before
using out-of-court statements that fell into the well-established
spontaneous declaration and medical examination hearsay excep-
tions. The majority, through ChiefJustice Rehnquist, found this re-
sult compelled by precedent.
Justice Thomas, with Justice Scalia, concurred, but objected
that "[t]he Court unnecessarily rejects, in dicta, the United States'
suggestion that the Confrontation Clause in general may not regu-
late the admission of hearsay evidence." 72 Justice Thomas contin-
ued that the text of the confrontation clause makes the phrase
"witnesses against him" the crucial portion for determining the cor-
rect outcome of White. 73 Thomas then quoted a recent opinion by
Justice Scalia that noted that the confrontation clause does not con-
tain an explicit hearsay prohibition.
70 Cf. Gutman, supra note 42, at 379 ("(i)t is impossible to understand the meaning of
the right to confrontation without focusing on the entire Sixth Amendment.") See also
Jonakait, supra note 65, at 581:
Confrontation is meaningless as a fundamental right if it has the mission the Court
ascribes to it. The Court, however, has divined this purpose for the clause by exam-
ining it in isolation.... The confrontation clause, however, does not sit by itself in
the Constitution. It has a context; it is but one provision of the Sixth Amendment.
If the clause is interpreted in that context, as part of the Sixth Amendment, a differ-
ent mission for the clause is apparent.
71 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
72 Id. at 744 (Thomas, J., with whom Scalia, J. joins, concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment). The majority had rejected the position offered by the United
States as amicus curiae. The federal government argued that the Sixth Amendment's con-
frontation clause was only meant to prevent a "particular abuse common in 16th and
17th century England: prosecuting a defendant through the presentation of expare affi-
davits, without the affiants ever being produced at trial." Id. at 740. The United States
concluded that the confrontation clause should only affect hearsay "in the character of
an ex parte affidavit, i.e., where the circumstances surround the out-of-court statement's
utterance suggest that the statement has been made for the principal purpose of accus-
ing or incriminating the defendant." Id. at 741.
The majority noted that reading would virtually eliminate confrontation's role in
restricting hearsay while Supreme Court precedents for a century have concluded that
confrontation does place more limits on hearsay than that suggested by the government.
The Court concluded, "We think that the argument presented by the Government
comes too late in the day to warrant reexamination ...." Id.
73 Id. at 744 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI) ("The Con-
frontation Clause provides simply that '[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. ... It is plain that the
critical phrase within the Clause for purposes of this case is 'witnesses against him.' ").
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Scalia had asserted that the noun "witness" could mean two
things-a person who knew or saw something or a person who testi-
fied in a judicial proceeding. He concluded, "The former meaning
(one 'who knows or sees') would cover hearsay evidence, but is ex-
cluded in the Sixth Amendment by the words following the noun:
'witness against him.' The phrase obviously refers to those who give
testimony against the defendant at trial."' 74
In other words, in this view the text in essence reads that the
accused can confront those who have testified at trial against the
accused. The Confrontation Clause, then, would place no limits on
hearsay. 75
Neither Scalia nor Thomas in these opinions, however, consid-
ers the Confrontation Clause in its Sixth Amendment context.
What seems so obvious in isolation seems less so when the words
after the Confrontation Clause are also examined. The Sixth
Amendment continues by guaranteeing the accused the right "to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor ......
If compulsory process and confrontation are read as part of one
Sixth Amendment, it can hardly make sense for "witnesses" to have
one meaning for confrontation and a different one for compulsory
process. If, however, "witness" only refers to one who testifies at a
judicial proceeding, then the Compulsory Process Clause makes no
sense. According to Thomas and Scalia's interpretation, compul-
sory process would have to mean that the accused has the right to
compel the presence and testimony of those who have testified at
the proceeding in the accused's favor. But, of course, if the witness
has already testified in the accused's favor, then the accused has no
need to have compulsory process. 76 The "obvious" reading of an
74 Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting.)
75 Justice Thomas finally suggests a confrontation standard that is inconsistent with
the Sixth Amendment text as he reads it, but which he says is both faithful to the provi-
sion's words and history: "The federal constitutional right of confrontation extends to
any witness who actually testifies at trial, but the Confrontation Clause is implicated by
extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." While, 112 S.
Ct. at 747.
76 The problems do not disappear if the Scalia-Thomas approach decided that "wit-
ness" meant "one who testifies or who will testify in ajudicial proceeding." This defini-
tion means that the Confrontation Clause could be satisfied by granting confrontation
before a person testifies. Indeed, the constitutional right could be satisfied by allowing
the accused to confront the witness before trial. This new definition would create new
problems for interpreting the Confrontation Clause, and the Compulsory Process
Clause would still make no sense. An accused does not need or desire compulsory pro-
cess for a person "who will testify." Granting the accused the right to compulsory pro-
cess for those who will testify is to create a tautology. An accused needs compulsory
process for "witnesses" who would not testify without being compelled. Id. at 748.
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isolated Confrontation Clause is plainly troublesome when read in
its Sixth Amendment context, and a meaningful and consistent
Sixth Amendment requires integrated readings.
F. ADVERSARY OR ADVOCACY RIGHTS?
Does the Sixth Amendment grant criminal defendants an adver-
sary system? In a previous article, as the quotation above indi-
cates, 77 I agreed with the Court opinions concluding that parts of
the Sixth Amendment work together to assure an adversary system.
As I read more about the development of English common law and
criminal procedure, however, I have started to believe that that con-
clusion should perhaps be modified.
The usual assumption has been that the Sixth Amendment in-
corporated common law protections 78 that arose largely in reaction
to abuses occurring in English political trials.7 9 This reliance on
state trials,8 0 which were largely treason cases, might be a mislead-
ing, or at least an incomplete, way of looking at the origins of the
Sixth Amendment.8'
Perhaps the most significant reason to be dubious of too much
dependence on the state trials as the source of the Sixth Amend-
ment is that English criminal procedure developed differently in
state trials than in ordinary criminal trials. The accused was granted
meaningful protections in treason trials that were denied in ordinary
cases. Most important, treason defendants were granted by statute
a right to counsel in 1696, and the same right was not granted in
ordinary criminal cases until 1836.82
77 See Jonakait, supra note 65, at II B.
78 See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, The Confrontation Clause Today in Light of its Common Law
Background, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 337, 343 (1991) ("[T]he framers of the Sixth Amend-
ment, when they chose to guarantee what was by then the well-developed English com-
mon law mode of trial .. ").
79 See, e.g., id. at 341 ("The Confrontation Clause often is described as a reaction to
the perceived injustice of the treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603.... Trials such
as that of Raleigh... did prompt the subsequent common law response that led to...
the Confrontation Clause.").
80 "By 'State Trials' is meant trials of state, that is, affairs of state-cases involving
high politics." John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. Cm. L. REV.
263, 265 (1978).
81 Cf id. at 266 ("Not only are the State Trials to some extent unreliable, they are
grossly unrepresentative as well. Yet from these few hundred cases of mostly political
crime we have derived our historical picture of the criminal trial.").
82 "Among the principal reforms of the Treason Act of 1696, [7 & 8 Wil. 3, c. 3, § 1
(1696)] was the extension of the right to counsel to the accused. This and other safe-
guards in the act applied exclusively to treason defendants, and not persons charged
with ordinary felony." Langbein, supra note 80, at 309 (alteration added). Similarly,
notice of the charges in treason cases had to be given ten days in advance of trial, but in
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Trials at early eighteenth century common law in ordinary fel-
ony cases differed sharply from modem trials. They were not pro-
ceedings fueled by advocates and adversaries. Instead, judges
basically did all the examination and cross-examination of witnesses
and, thus, dominated the presentation of information to the jury.83
Trials in ordinary felony cases did change during the eighteenth
century. The most significant factor was the increasing presence in
ordinary criminal trials of defense attorneys, which did not occur on
any regular basis until close to the time of our Constitution's adop-
tion.8 4 Attorneys, when permitted, however, were limited in their
the ordinary cases, notice was not given until the trial began. See THE LAW PRACTICE OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 685-87 (Julius Goebel, Jr. et al. eds., 1964). See also Langbein,
supra note 80, at 283 (contending that although a privilege against self-incrimination
may have existed in state trials by the early eighteenth century, it did not exist in ordi-
nary felony prosecutions).
Counsel was not fully extended to the accused in England until the passage of the
Prisoner's Counsel Act in 1836. 6 & 7 Win. IV, c. 114 (1836). For the history of the
passage of this statute, see J. M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English
Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAw & HIST. REV. 221, 250-58
(1991).
83 See Beattie, supra note 82, at 221-23:
Accused felons might seek a lawyer's advice on points of law, but if they wanted to
question the prosecution evidence or to put forward a defense, they had to do that
on their own behalf. The victim of a felony (who most often acted as prosecutor in a
system that depended fundamentally on private prosecution) was free to hire a law-
yer to manage the presentation of his or her case. But in fact few did so. Thejudges were generally the only participants in felony trials with professional train-
ing. They dominated the courtroom and orchestrated the brief confrontation be-
tween the victim and the accused that was at the heart of the trial....
The facts at issue were normally presented orally by the victim of the offense,
supported by witnesses who, like the victim, gave their evidence briefly and gener-
ally under the questioning of the judge. The judge acted as examiner and cross-
examiner-although the defendant and jurors could ask question and often did so
by blurting them out ....
The accused could not compel the attendance of witnesses. At the trial itself,
accused felons had to speak in their defense and to respond to prosecution evidence
as it was given, and as they heard it for the first time. If they did not or could not
defend themselves, no one would do it for them.
See also Langbein, supra note 80, at 282-83:
What we today think of as the lawyers' role was to some extent filled by the other
participants in the trial, especially the judge. But a lot of what lawyers now do was
left undone .... [W]e can be confident that there was much less probing of wit-
nesses' statements than we expect in modern counsel-conducted trials.
84 See Langbein, supra note 80, at 263 ("Whereas much of our trial procedure has
medieval antecedents, .prosecution and defense counsel cannot be called regular until
the second half of the eighteenth century.") Professor Langbein finds the first recorded
presence of defense attorneys in ordinary cases in the 1730's. Id. at 311-12. He also
sees the breakdown of the rule preventing attorneys from representing accused felons as
one of the most significant changes in English criminal procedure. Id. at 307. See also
Beattie, supra note 82, at 233-34 (citation omitted) (finding that by the 1780's defense
attorneys saw themselves as advocates for the accused and concluding, "It was in this
area that the criminal trial changed most manifestly in the eighteenth century, in practice
and in intention.").
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role. Most important, defense lawyers could not formally address
the jury.8 5 The attorney's presence was largely felt through the
cross-examination of witnesses testifying against the accused.86
That the increasing use of counsel and cross-examination de-
veloped together does support the argument that the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel should be read not in isolation, but together
with other rights. 87 This joint evolution in England, however, did
not evolve in response to an adversary system. The accused, in
practice, seldom faced a prosecutorial adversary in these common
law trials. The prosecution's case was rarely presented by an advo-
cate for the prosecution.88 Instead, as discussed above,8 9 the factual
development at trial, until the rise of defense attorneys, had been
controlled by the judges.90 The increased presence of defense at-
85 See Beattie, supra note 82, at 230-31 (citation omitted):
[D]efense [lawyer's were constrained] in such a way that the accused were forced to
continue to speak for themselves in court. The right to full defense by counsel was
not granted until the passage of the Prisoner's Counsel Act of 1836.... In particu-
lar, counsel were not allowed to speak to the jury on their client's behalf or to offer
a defense against the facts put in evidence. Until 1836, prisoners who said that they
wished to leave their defense to counsel were told that that was not possible and
that they must speak for themselves.
See also Langbein, supra note 80, at 313 ("The prohibition upon defense counsel address-
ing the jury in summation continued to be enforced until it was abolished by statute in
1836.").
86 See Stephen Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eight-
eenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 535 (1990):
Over the course of the [eighteenth] century, counsel most particularly developed
the art of interrogating adverse witnesses. Because defense counsel's role was lim-
ited in other regards, it is not surprising that barristers defending those accused of
felonies focused their attention on cross-examination, a mechanism that offered the
broadest latitude for the development of persuasive proof with a minimum of re-
strictions. Through cross-examination, defense counsel could present his theory of
the case, refute an opponent's claims, develop favorable proof, discredit opposing
witnesses, and generally advance his client's position before the jury.
See also Beattie, supra note 82, at 233 ("Undoubtedly the greatest opportunities [for de-
fense attorneys] to help their clients were provided by cross-examination .... ").
87 This joint development, perhaps, also tells us something significant about what
Sixth Amendment "confrontation" might mean.
88 Beattie, supra note 82, at 227 ("[N]ot more than ten percent of defendants are
likely to have had counsel through the middle decades of the eighteenth century, and
significantly fewer prosecutors.") He estimates that in the 1780's, twice as many defense
counsel appeared as did prosecuting attorneys. Id. at 229. Indeed, even well into the
next century, few prosecuting attorneys appeared at felonies in London. Beattie calcu-
lates that such attorneys appeared in 8 percent of the cases in 1830 and in 4.3 percent in
1840. Id. at 260 n.20.
89 See supra pp. 738-43.
90 If those prosecuting a crime in eighteenth century England wanted an attorney to
present the case, they had to pay for the services. Beattie suggests that this furnishes a
reason why there were few prosecuting attorneys, but continues:
Reluctance to engage [prosecution] counsel also perhaps arose from victims' per-
ception of the process of prosecution and trial, particularly from the deeply en-
trenched notion that it was the magistrate's duty as the king's agent to organize the
740 [Vol. 82
FOREWORD
torneys along with the concomitant defense cross-examination in
ordinary trials, then, did not check a prosecutorial adversary, but
instead checked or counterbalanced the judicial development of
facts at trial.9 1 Looked at this way, the "adversary rights" were not
really adversary. Instead, they were the rights of an advocate given
to the accused to restrain the power of judges.9 2
Looking at counsel, confrontation, and compulsory process not
as rights to balance an adversary, but as limitations on judges,
makes the separate sections of the Sixth Amendment consistent with
each other. Just as the jury trial provisions can be seen as largely a
check on judicial authority to determine the facts, counsel, confron-
tation, and compulsory process can also be seen as a check on the
authority of judges to control the information that the jury can
consider.
Even if further historical probing does support these tentative
views of the common law, too much reliance can be placed on Eng-
lish law as a source of the Sixth Amendment. The colonial Ameri-
can history must also be examined and factored in for at least two
reasons. First, Americans from an early stage viewed criminal law in
a manner distinct from how the English viewed it. England saw
criminal violations as a private matter between individuals.9 3 Colo-
nial Americans, on the other hand, conceived of crimes as offenses
against the state.9 4 If the Americans held distinctive views about
prosecution. Most victims who chose to initiate a prosecution must have thought
that the old system was adequate and that it would be enough if they came to court
and told their stories to the judge and jury.
Beattie, supra note 82, at 229.
91 See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 80, at 306 ("[V]arious factors, in particular the rise of
the lawyers. ... cost the judges their commanding role .... ) A central feature of this
dominant role was judicial interrogation. "Such questioning tended to concentrate
power in the court's hands, and made it possible for English judges to act like inquisitors
.... [Judicial inquisition] maximizes judicial power while holding to a minimum the
parties' opportunity to develop the proof." Landsman, supra note 86, at 513. As cross-
examination by defense attorneys presented an alternative source of information for the
jury, judicial authority became checked. Landsman concludes, "The adversary system
grew as a consequence of the steady narrowing of judicial authority. Lawyers sup-
planted judges as managers of the courtroom contest." Id. at 604.
92 Cf. Beattie, supra note 82, at 254, who in discussing the debates that led to the
English legislation of 1836 granting the right of counsel, states that "the proponents of
the legislation increasingly upheld the value of advocacy."
93 See JOAN JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 8 (1980):
English common law did not make the sharp distinction between civil wrongs and
criminal wrongs .... All violations of law were committed by an individual against
an individual .... A violation of the King's rights were prosecuted by the King's
Attorney. Violations of individual rights were pursued through the courts by the
victim or by his friend or relatives.
94 See id. at 10:
Although the system of private prosecution prevailed in the English world at the
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crime, then it is reasonable to believe that they also developed dis-
tinctively different views of criminal procedure. If so, of course, the
Sixth Amendment is at least as likely to reflect those American con-
ceptions as it does the English common law.
Furthermore, English law cannot be seen as the sole source of
the Sixth Amendment because clearly the Sixth Amendment rejects
at least some of that law. It rejected it by mandating the same guar-
antees in all criminal prosecutions and by failing to treat political
prosecutions differently from other cases. It also rejected English
law in granting a right to the full assistance of counsel in all those
cases, a right that did not then exist in England and did not come
into being there until almost a half century later. Surely the devel-
opment of this early guarantee of the right to counsel in all cases in
America is crucial for a proper understanding of the Sixth
Amendment.
The proper historical background of the Sixth Amendment
must include more than just English political trials and more than
the development of criminal procedure in ordinary English felony
trials. The American history must also be considered. What I have
concluded elsewhere about the confrontation clause applies gener-
ally to the Sixth Amendment rights to notice, counsel, confronta-
tion, and compulsory process:
An accurate understanding of the historical origins of the confronta-
tion clause . . . requires study of the protections Americans thought
were necessary in ordinary American criminal trials.... Americans ...
did feel that some criminal convictions were unjust. We need to ex-
amine these cases to understand how Americans of the constitutional
generation thought that such injustice might be prevented. Those
thoughts about non-treason trials in America no doubt became re-
flected in the Sixth Amendment. Until this American history is ex-
amined, our understanding of the development of the confrontation
clause will be incomplete. 95
This inquiry could be significant. It might give us a better his-
torical idea of the content of the procedures that were adopted by
the constitutional generation. The importance of this examination,
however, can be overstated. Whatever such study reveals, the basic
proposition will remain. Whether they are labeled adversary rights
or the rights of the advocate; whether they were seen as a counter-
time of the establishment of the first American colonies ... , it quickly vanished in
America.... [Private prosecution's] basic supposition [is] that crime is essentially a
private concern between the aggressor and the victim.... [T]he American system
conceives of the criminal act to be a public occurrence and of society as a whole the
ultimate victim.
95 Randolph N. Jonakait, The Right to Confrontation: Not a Mere Restraint on Government,
76 MINN. L. REV. 501, 506-07 (1992).
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balance to the prosecutor or a restraint on judicial authority; the
Sixth Amendment granted the accused rights so that the accused
could inform the jury from the accused's perspective of the facts and
arguments concerning the charges.
IV. A RETURN To Mu'MIN
The precepts that all the Sixth Amendment protections were
meant to operate as a restraint on judicial authority and that the
amendment grants rights so that the accused can inform the jury
from his perspective once again suggest a different way to approach
the problem presented in MuMin. The question of whether a juror
is impartial is, of course, not a jury decision; the trial judge has to
make it. While the Sixth Amendment does tell us that the jury is to
be informed from the accused's perspective, it does not tell us any-
thing directly on how the trial court is to be informed in making its
constitutional determination of whether a juror is impartial.
MuMin, however, should have considered the significance of the
similarities between the trial judge's determination and the jury's.
First, the decision of whether a jury is impartial is a factual
question of precisely the same sort juries are asked to decide. As
the Supreme Court has recognized, whether a juror is impartial "is
plainly one of historical fact: did ajuror swear that he could set aside
any opinion he might hold and decide the case on the evidence, and
should the juror's protestation of impartiality have been be-
lieved." 96 Furthermore, a federal reviewing court must treat this
factfinding in much the same way it would treat a jury decision and
defer to it as long as it is reasonable.97 Finally, just as the Sixth
Amendment indicates that a jury cannot render a constitutionally
correct verdict unless it is properly informed, a trial court cannot
make a constitutionally correct decision on juror impartiality unless
it is properly informed.
"Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant
that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored.
Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge's responsibility to remove
prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court's
instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled." 98
96 Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036 (1984).
97 The Supreme Court has held that the trial court's ruling of juror impartiality
should be treated with "special deference," id. at 1038, and sustained if "there is fair
support in the record for the state courts' conclusion that the jurors ... would be impar-
tial." Id.
98 Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (White, J., for the
plurality).
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A proper question in Mu'Mn, then, might have been whether
the Sixth Amendment speaks to how this factfinder, the trial court,
must be informed in making this Sixth Amendment decision. Since
the accused has a Sixth Amendment right to inform the jury from
his perspective, does he have an analogous right to have this
factfinder similarly informed? An affirmative answer would be con-
sistent with the purposes and structure of the Sixth Amendment
considered as a whole. 99 At a minimum, the Court should have
been concerned with whether giving the trial judge virtually unfet-
tered discretion over the factual decision and the elicitation of infor-
mation upon which that determination rested comports with the
purposes and structure of the Sixth Amendment considered as a
whole.
V. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
Whatever the particular questions or analogies that should be
used to resolve specific Sixth Amendment disputes, two principles
emerge whose application are generally necessary if the Sixth
Amendment is to be interpreted in a consistently meaningful man-
ner. First, the Sixth Amendment does not prevent fundamentally
unfair trials. Instead, it affirmatively guarantees the accused a cer-
tain sort of trial. The Sixth Amendment grants the criminal defend-
ant a public, speedy trial decided by impartial jurors who are
informed from a defense advocate's viewpoint.
This grant is not simply coequal to a fair trial. A trial in deroga-
tion of the Sixth Amendment can also be fundamentally fair. For
example, the Sixth Amendment guarantees ajury trial, but certainly
a bench trial can also be fundamentally fair. Indeed, as the Supreme
Court has stated, "[a] criminal process which was fair and equitable
but used no juries is easy to imagine."' 0 0 Even though a bench trial
can be a fair one, the accused is denied his Sixth Amendment rights
if he is not affirmatively granted a jury trial. And so it goes for the
other Sixth Amendment rights. Due process and the Sixth Amend-
ment may overlap, but due process does not make the Sixth
redundant.
Similarly, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused not the
99 An affirmative answer does not mean that the accused has an unfettered right to
elicit information from prospective jurors. Just as limitations can be placed on the ac-
cused's right to elicit information at a trial, they can also be placed here. Perhaps the
most appropriate Sixth Amendment cases to examine would have been the confronta-
tion decisions concerning whether the accused's attempt to elicit information from a
trial witness could be limited. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
100 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968).
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most reliable truth-determining forum, but a particular process for
resolving criminal charges.' 01 The accused is entitled to an impar-
tial jury informed from the accused's perspective about the evidence
and the event even if some other method would determine the facts
better or just as well. Thus, even if a judge would determine the
facts better than ajury, the accused is entitled to have the jury make
the determination. Even if the jury could decide the dispute just as
well with only an inquisitorial presentation, the accused is granted
the right to inform the jury from his perspective about the
charge.10 2
When the Court decides a Sixth Amendment claim by deter-
mining whether the trial was "fair" or by determining whether the
outcome was "reliable,"'' 0 3 the Court is not properly interpreting
the Sixth Amendment. The Court must instead determine whether
the particular process constitutionalized in the Sixth Amendment
has been affirmatively granted to the accused.
101 cf. Jonakait, supra note 65, at 585 ("Neither a defendant nor society is given the
Sixth Amendment right to the best truth-determining process. The amendment only
guarantees the accused one particular process ... .
102 Cf iaL
[T]he accused is guaranteed an adversary criminal trial even if that is not the best
truth-determining process for him. Just as the state cannot deny an accused a jury
trial by establishing that a nonjury trial was the better way to determine the facts,
the accused cannot be denied an adversary criminal trial even if an inquisitorial
proceeding would have determined the truth better in the accused's case.
103 The Court has equated fairness and reliability. In setting the standard for ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, the Court concluded that the accused must show his counsel's
deficient performance deprived him "of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). If fairness equals reliability, than a
reliable outcome should mean that the trial was fair. Presumably an accurate outcome is
a reliable one. The Court's logic means as long as the verdict is "correct," the proce-
dures used to obtain it had to have been fair. The procedures, then, do not truly matter
as long as we conclude that the verdict was "right."
Such reasoning would not truly be an interpretation of the Sixth Amendment in our
Bill of Rights. The Sixth Amendment constitutionalizes procedures, a process, not the
correct determination. The innocent person who is convicted after a speedy, public trial
to an impartial jury where the accused had the rights to counsel, confrortation, and
compulsory process has not been denied his Sixth Amendment rights. Similarly, how-
ever, the guilty person convicted in a trial where he has not been affirmatively granted
all that the Sixth Amendment guarantees has been convicted in violation of the constitu-
tion, even though the outcome is accurate or reliable or fair.
We may hope that accurate factfinding results from a valid trial under the Sixth
Amendment, but accuracy is not what is guaranteed. Cf. Jonakait, supra note 65, at 585-
86:
[W]hile confrontation, in its service to the adversary system, may concomitantly ad-
vance the truth-determining process, confrontation's mission, like the mission of
other Sixth Amendment rights, is to help guarantee the adversary system. The ad-
vancement of the truth-determining process is merely the incidental benefit from
confrontation's real purpose of guaranteeing the adversary system as set forth in the
Sixth Amendment.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has frequently interpreted the Sixth
Amendment so that an accused must show a due process violation
to win a Sixth Amendment claim. This makes the Sixth Amendment
protection superfluous and is an incorrect way to interpret the
Constitution.
For a consistent and meaningful Sixth Amendment, courts must
view the Sixth Amendment as holding a central place in the Bill of
Rights; must recognize that Sixth Amendment rights are affirmative,
personal guarantees to the accused; and must interpret the rights in
their Sixth Amendment context. When this is done, it is clear that
the Sixth Amendment guarantees neither a fair trial nor a reliable
outcome, but grants the accused a particular trial process, which
does specify a way to determine facts, but which is also intended to
check governmental overreaching.
